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Abstract
We present a generalized version of the knapsack protocol proposed by
D. Naccache and J. Stern at the Proceedings of Eurocrypt (1997). Our
new framework will allow the construction of other knapsack protocols
having similar security features. We will outline a very concrete example
of a new protocol using extension fields of a finite field of small char-
acteristic instead of the prime field Z/pZ, but more efficient in terms of
computational costs for asymptotically equal information rate and similar
key size.
1 Introduction
Building new asymmetric encryption schemes has always been one of the main
goals of cryptographers. After the idea of public key cryptography was pre-
sented in [1], only few more public key encryption schemes were developed such
as the RSA [2], the El Gamal [3], the McEliece cryptosystem [4], the NTRU [5]
or the HFE [6] (for an overview [7, 8]). Some new ideas for building new cryp-
tographic schemes based on semigroup actions can also be found in [9], while in
the context of knapsack quantum cryptographic schemes we refer for instance
to [10]. What D. Naccache and J. Stern built in [11] was a proposal for an
asymmetric protocol (NSK) following the earlier ideas of Morii and Kasahara
in [12], further developed by Kasahara et al. in [13, 14]. The NSK protocol
consists of a shuffling modulo p of an easy problem over the integers, i.e. the
factorization of a composite integer where the prime factors are chosen among
a fixed set of small size. Given p a prime and Z/pZ the finite field of remainder
classes, the NSK protocol is based on the unique factorization property of Z,
which guarantees the uniqueness of the encryption.
This approach can be generalized to the case of multiplicative monoids (Sec-
tion 2), and the NSK protocol is just a particular instance for the monoid (Z, ·)
of the general framework (subsection 2.1). Using this new general setting we
are able to construct an analogous of the NSK protocol relying on the unique
factorization properties of Fq[x], instead of Z, where Fq is the finite field of order
q (Section 3). The security of our particular proposal will rely on the arithmetic
structure of the finite field Fq[x]/(h(x)) for some h(x) ∈ Fq[x], irreducible of
suitable degree (instead of the finite field of remainder classes Z/pZ). One of
the main advantages of this kind of setting is that the security is based on an
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exponentiation over a finite field in such a way that it will be unfeasible for an
attacker even to set up a discrete logarithm problem (DLP). Indeed, as we will
show in the following, since the optimal version of the NSK protocol requires
that the chosen prime be next to
∏
i pi, the factorization of p− j for some small
j could allow for a reduction to a DLP. In our case, instead, we choose a set
of irreducible polynomials and fix the degree of the reducing polynomial. By
doing so there is no information leakage. Our new structural conditions will be
related only to the degree of the carrier polynomials used for the encryption,
avoiding any kind of DLP reduction.
In subsection 3.2.3 some issues concerning the security of the protocol will
be addressed, in particular to avoid subgroup attacks, that could possibly lead
to information.
This new setting will lead to some advantages in terms of computational
costs of encryption and decryption. In fact, arithmetics over finite fields Fqm is
considered to be preferrable than arithmetics over Zp when p ≃ q
m and q ≪ p
in terms of computations. We will analyse the key features of our protocol, such
as the number of parameters involved for the setting up of the public key, and
this will allow us to show a greater deal of flexibility, in comparison with the
NSK protocol.
In subsection 3.2.2 we will analise the asymptotics of the information rate
of our protocol, showing that it is equal to that of [11]. An exact formula for
the information rate will also be provided.
As a subproduct, we present in Section 3.3 a variation of the polynomial pro-
tocol where the irreducibility of h(x) is dropped. The encryption is performed
over a suitable direct sum of fields, and a decryption is available thanks to the
Chinese Remainder Theorem.
2 The new class
In this section we will present a generalized version of the protocol presented in
[11].
Let S be a monoid and ∼ a finite index congruence on S. We will denote
the class of an element s ∈ S with respect to ∼ as [s].
Definition 1. A morphism ψ will be said to be ∼proper, if
• ψ : S −→ S is injective
• ψ is compatible with ∼ (i.e. ψ(x) ∼ ψ(y) iff x ∼ y)
• the induced application ψ˜ : S/∼ −→ S/∼ is invertible.
Definition 2. Given L ∈ N we will say that S is L-cryptable under ∼ if there
exists a ∼proper morphism ψ and elements s1, . . . , sL ∈ S such that
αψ∼ : Z
L
2 −→ S/ ∼
m = (m1, . . . ,mL) 7→
[
L∏
i=1
ψ(si)
mi
]
is an injective application.
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The following proposition will be useful later on
Proposition 1. Given a monoid S that is L-cryptable under ∼, the following
maps are also injective:
αψ : ZL2 −→ S
(m1, . . . ,mL) 7→
L∏
i=1
ψ(si)
mi
α∼ : Z
L
2 −→ S/ ∼
(m1, . . . ,mL) 7→
[
L∏
i=1
smii
]
α : ZL2 −→ S
(m1, . . . ,mL) 7→
L∏
i=1
smii .
Proof. The proof follows by observing that, since ψ is ∼proper morphism, then
also α∼ is injective. Also α
ψ
∼ injective implies that α
ψ is injective. Again, since
ψ is an injection, also α is injective.
As we have already pointed out, this properties are necessary to keep the
encryption meaningful. In the following we will see how it is possible to find
non trivial examples of this construction.
Now, denote the image of any map f between sets by ℑ(f), and consider
the following problems:
Problem 1. Given c ∈ ℑ(αψ∼) find m such that α
ψ
∼(m) = c
Problem 2. Given c′ ∈ ℑ(α∼) find m such that α∼(m) = c
′.
Let now S, be an L-cryptable monoid under a congruence ∼. Whenever a
given triple (S,∼, ψ) is such that Problem 1 is difficult, Problem 2 is easy we
define a cryptosystem as follows. Let
(S,∼, L, ψ˜([s1]), . . . , ψ˜([sL]))
be the public key and
(ψ˜−1, s1, . . . , sL)
be the secret key, the main operations are given by
• Encryption: E(m) := αψ∼(m) =
∏L
i=1 ψ˜([si])
mi =: c
• Decryption: D(c) is given by solving Problem 2 for c′ = ψ˜−1(c).
Remark 1. The reader should observe that in the definition of the protocol
we did not use the injectivity of ψ nor the fact that S/ ∼ is a quotient of a
monoid S. This is nevertheless the case in all the examples of this protocol we
could find, where Problem 2 is easy since a suitable lift to S is given. Indeed, in
practical situations the problem will be solved computing (α−1 ◦Γ)(c′) where Γ
is a lift S/ ∼−→ S such that the following diagram
3
ZL
2
α
//
α∼
""
❊
❊
❊
❊
❊
❊
❊
❊
❊
ℑ(α)
ℑ(α∼)
Γ̂
OO
(1)
commutes when Γ̂ := Γ|ℑ(α∼)
Remark 2. Notice that the information rate is given by L/b where b is the
number of bits that are needed to represent an element of S/ ∼
In what follows we will show how the NSK protocol fits in this rather general
framework, as well as brand new protocols involving polynomials over finite
fields.
2.1 NSK as a particular instance
In this section we will show how the Naccache-Stern (NSK) protocol fits in our
general framework, in the case S = (Z, ·).
Consider the prime ideal P = 〈p〉 generated by a prime number p ∈ Z. Let
us denote by ∼ the congruence induced by the ideal P . Such a congruence is
obviously of finite index. Let v be a positive integer with u = v−1 mod p− 1,
and let
ψ : Z −→ Z
a 7−→ av.
It can be easily checked that ψ is a ∼proper morphism of Z.
Now choose L distinct prime numbers pi such that
∏L
i=1 pi < p.
Proposition 2. The map
αψ∼ : Z
L
2 −→ Z/pZ
(m1, . . . ,mL) 7−→
[
L∏
i=1
pmivi
]
(2)
is an injection and (Z, ·) is therefore L-cryptable under the relation induced by
the ideal generated by p.
Proof. Assume that there exist two L-tuples (m1, . . . ,mL), (n1, . . . , nL) such
that αψ∼(m1, . . . ,mL) = α
ψ
∼(n1, . . . , nL), then:[
L∏
i=1
pmivi
]
=
[
L∏
i=1
pnivi
]
⇒
[
L∏
i=1
pmivi
]u
=
[
L∏
i=1
pnivi
]u
⇔
[
L∏
i=1
pmii
]
=
[
L∏
i=1
pnii
]
in Z/pZ. Since
∏L
i=1 p
mi
i and
∏L
i=1 p
ni
i are smaller than p we also have
L∏
i=1
pmii =
L∏
i=1
pnii (3)
in the unique factorization domain Z, which implies mi = ni ∀i.
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Remark 3. Notice that we are able to express equation (3) because we can
always consider the canonical representative x ∈ {0, . . . , p− 1} in the remainder
class modulo p. This representative is also the only representative in ℑ(α) by
construction, and therefore we have a canonical lift satisfying (1).
Remark 4. The reader should observe that when p = t +
∏
i pi for t small,
than the information rate is maximal. Unfortunately in this case factoring p− t
is easy because p − t is pL-smooth and pL ≪ p, and this gives informations
about the bare carriers pi’s. Indeed in this case breaking the NSK protocol is
not harder than solving the DLP for the pi’s. Nevertheless the protocol remains
interesting for additional features like [11, Section 3].
3 A polynomial version
In this section we give a version of the protocol that works over Fqd instead of
Z/pZ in such a way that qd will be of the same order of magnitude than the
size p of the field Z/pZ in the NSK but q ≪ p. In this case the specific difficult
problem we want to rely on is the following
Problem 3. Let F be a finite field and L ∈ N.Given y1, . . . , yL ∈ F,
α : ZL2 −→ F
α(m) =
∏
i
ymii
and c ∈ ℑ(α), find m such that α(m) = c.
Let now k = Fq and k[x] the polynomial ring in one variable over k. Let
h(x) be an irreducible element in k[x] of degree d. Set ∼ to be the congruence
associated to the idealH = 〈h(x)〉 generated by the irreducible polynomial h(x).
An efficient algorithm to find irreducible polynomials of fixed degree is given,
for instance in [15]. Set
S = (k[x], ·)
and
S′ := S/ ∼ = ((k[x]/H)∗, ·)
where (k[x]/H)∗ = (k[x]/H) \ {0}. Fix v, u ∈ N such that gcd (v, |S′|) =
gcd (v, qd − 1) = 1 and uv ≡ 1 mod |S′|. Set
ψ˜ : S′ −→ S′
[s] 7−→ [sv].
Remark 5.
• ψ˜−1 : [z] 7−→ [z]u
• k[x]/H ∼= Fqd is again a finite field
Let now L ∈ N such that there exist L distinct irreducible monic polynomials
p1, . . . , pL ∈ Fq[x] with the property
L∑
i=1
deg pi < d. (4)
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Notice that in the present description of the protocol there are several different
strategies to choose the polynomials; we will analyse the properties of some
interesting choices in the following sections.
Again, we have the encryption map:
Proposition 3. (k[x], ·) is an L cryptable monoid with the map
αψ∼ : Z
L
2 −→ S
′
m = (m1, . . . ,mL) 7−→
[
L∏
i=1
pvmii
]
.
(5)
Proof. Definition 2 requires that the map αψ∼ be an injection. Assume
αψ∼(m1, . . . ,mL) = α
ψ
∼(n1, . . . , nL)[
L∏
i=1
pvmii
]
=
[
L∏
i=1
pvnii
]
.
It follows [
L∏
i=1
pvmii
]u
=
[
L∏
i=1
pvnii
]u
[
L∏
i=1
pmii
]
=
[
L∏
i=1
pnii
]
where, in the last equation, we can assume no reduction has happened, since
property (4) holds. Indeed
L∏
i=1
pmii =
L∏
i=1
pnii . (6)
Recalling that k[x] is a unique factorization domain we have mi = ni ∀i.
So our cyphered text is given by c(x) = αψ∼(m1, . . . ,mL). The explicit
decryption for this protocol is simply given by the polynomial division of the
decyphered code (c(x))u, that is to say
mi = 1⇐⇒ (c(x))
u = 0 mod pi(x). (7)
Remark 6. We stress once again the fact that in obtaining equation (6) we
used the canonical lift
Γ: S/ ∼−→ S
[f(x)] 7−→ g(x)
where, for any representative l(x) ∈ [f(x)], g(x) is the remainder of the division
of l(x) by h(x) in k[x], and it is obviously independent of the choice of l(x).
The decryption is effectively performed in ℑ(α) and the solution to Problem 2
is then given by (α−1 ◦ Γ)(c(x)u).
The information rate I = L/ deg(h) log2(q) depends on the choice of the
carrier polynomials. We will explain later how to maximise this value.
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Remark 7. Once the pi’s are fixed the top information rate for this protocol
is obtained when we choose h(x) such that
L∑
i=1
deg pi = deg h− 1. (8)
Indeed the information rate can always be maximised since it is always possible
to choose h(x) in k[x] such that (8) is satisfied (cf. Remark 4) without allowing
for a straightforward reduction to a DLP. This case will be analysed in detail
in 3.2.1.
3.1 A simple example
We now give an example in which k[x] = F2[x] and the space of messages has
size 29. In order to reach a message size of 9 bits, we need exactly 9 keys, that
is to say monic irreducible polynomials in F2[x]. From finite field theory, we
know that there are exactly q monic polinomials of degree 1, and
qd − q
d
irreducible monic polynomials of prime degree d. So, for q = 2 we have two
polynomials of degree 1, one polynomial of degree 2, two polynomials of degree
3 and six polynomials of degree 5. For the sake of simplicity, even if the ex-
ample is non optimal as we will explain, let us choose all the irreducible monic
polynomials of degree 1,2 and 5, summing up to exactly 9 keys, namely:
p1 = x (9)
p2 = 1 + x (10)
p3 = 1 + x+ x
2 (11)
p4 = 1 + x
2 + x5 (12)
p5 = 1 + x
3 + x5 (13)
p6 = 1+ x+ x
2 + x3 + x5 (14)
p7 = 1+ x+ x
2 + x4 + x5 (15)
p8 = 1+ x+ x
3 + x4 + x5 (16)
p9 = 1 + x
2 + x3 + x4 + x5. (17)
Then, the public key h(x) must be of degree
d = deg(h(x)) =
9∑
i=1
deg(pi(x)) + 1 = 35
and irreducible. For instance we may take
h(x) = 1 + x2 + x35 (18)
and set our protocol onto F235 ∼= (F2[x]/H)
∗, whose order is 235 − 1 when
H = 〈h(x)〉. We choose the secret key and the decryption exponent, accordingly,
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to be v = 3821 and u = 25169564954, so that uv = 1 mod(235 − 1). Then we
may publish the 9 carrier keys pvi mod (h(x), 2):
pv1 =1 + x
2 + x4 + x10 + x12 + x18 + x22 (19)
+ x23 + x24 + x26 + x27 + x29 + x32
pv2 =x+ x
3 + x5 + x6 + x7 + x10 + x12 + x13 (20)
+ x17 + x20 + x21 + x22 + x24 + x28 + x30 + x32
pv3 =x+ x
4 + x5 + x7 + x13 + x20 + x22 (21)
+ x28 + x29 + x30 + x31 + x32 + x33 + x34
pv4 =1 + x
2 + x3 + x4 + x11 + x14 + x15 + x17 + x18 (22)
+ x19 + x20 + x21 + x24 + x28 + x30 + x34
pv5 =1 + x+ x
2 + x3 + x4 + x7 + x8 + x9 + x10 + x11 + x15 (23)
+ x18 + x20 + x21 + x22 + x24 + x26 + x29 + x32 + x33
pv6 =1 + x+ x
2 + x4 + x7 + x12 + x13 + x15 + x16+ (24)
x18 + x21 + x22 + x23 + x24 + x30 + x34
pv7 =1 + x
4 + x8 + x9 + x10 + x15 + x19 + x28 + x30 + x32 + x33 (25)
pv8 =x+ x
3 + x4 + x5 + x8 + x10 + x12 + x13 + x15 + x16 (26)
+ x17 + x25 + x26 + x27 + x28 + x30
pv9 =x+ x
4 + x6 + x7 + x10 + x11 + x12 + x13 + x14 + x15 + x16 (27)
+ x17 + x18 + x20 + x23 + x24 + x30 + x31 + x32 + x33.
Suppose we want to send the message m = 111000111 ∈ Z92, we encode it
into
c =
9∏
i=1
pvmii mod (h(x), 2) =
= x2 + x3 + x6 + x10 + x15 + x16 + x17 + x18
+ x20 + x21 + x23 + x26 + x27 + x30 + x31 + x33 + x34. (28)
Once the message has been received, it is sufficient to take the u-th power,
and the result is as follows:
cu =
9∏
i=1
pvumii mod (h(x), 2) =
9∏
i=1
pmii =
= x+ x3 + x4 + x6 + x11 + x12 + x14 + x15 + x16 + x19 (29)
whose factorization yields:
Factor2(c
u) =x(1 + x)(1 + x+ x2)(1 + x+ x2 + x3 + x5)
(1 + x+ x3 + x4 + x5)(1 + x2 + x3 + x4 + x5).
(30)
We used the factorization algorithm in this simple example because we are
working with small messages. The decryption algorithm presented in (7) is to
be considered preferential.
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The information rate associated to this encryption protocol is
I =
L
deg(h)
=
9
35
∼= 25, 7% (31)
with the size of the space of messages being 29.
Remark 8. A similar example is presented in [11], with 28 messages. In the
cited example the information rate is slightly higher than ours, yet comparable,
but the space of messages is smaller.
If we wanted to match the size of space of messages it would be sufficient to
remove one polynomial of degree 5, obtaining an information rate of I = 8/30 ∼
26, 7%.
Remarkably enough, as in the NSK-protocol there is apparently no key leak-
age, our protocol preserves the security of the carrier keys. As a matter of fact,
factoring the cyphertext c, one gets no information whatsoever on the cleartext,
as it can be seen in the given example:
Factor2(c) = x
2
(
x4 + x3 + 1
)
(x28 + x25 + x24 + x23 + x22 + x21 + x20 + x18+
x17 + x15 + x14 + x12 + x11 + x10 + x8 + x6 + x5 + x4 + x3 + x+ 1) (32)
Remark 9. More generally, let g(x) be the public modulus and
pvm11 p
vm2
2 · · · p
vmL
L ≡ c(x) mod g(x)
a cyphetext. Observe that over Fq[x] we have
P (x) = pvm11 p
vm2
2 . . . p
vmL
L = t(x)g(x) + c(x)
for some t(x) ∈ Fq[x]. Now notice that infering on the factorization of P (x)
from the data of c(x) in terms of the factor basis
{pvm11 , . . . , p
vmL
L }
is the difficult problem on which the protocol relies, since the factorization
of polynomials behaves badly with respect to reductions modulo irreducible
polynomials. As a matter of fact, we base the security of our protocol on the
randomness of the factorization of elements in the image of the map
Γg,c : Fq[x] −→ Fq[x]
Γg,c(t(x)) = t(x)g(x) + c(x)
In general, the usual security one expects using prime numbers as carriers (NSK)
can be extended to monic irreducible polynomials.
As we already pointed out, we are using here a non-optimal setting for
our example, in that we skipped the polynomials of degree 3 and 4, and used
all those of degree 5 instead. If we decided to optimize the information rate,
we could take the two polynomials of degree 1, the single polynomial of degree
2, two of degree 3 and three of degree 4, for an overall encoding power of 28
messages. Notice that the space of messages is again equal to the example given
in [11].
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Choosing polynomials of degree 3 and 4 instead of 5 allows us to reduce the
degree of h(x), that is to say the number of bits that are needed to encrypt a
message. So, if we compute the information rate in this case we obtain a much
better result:
I =
log2m
log2 c
=
8
23
∼= 34, 78% (33)
which is slightly higher than the information rate presented in [11] for the same
message size.
The procedure works exactly the same when we change the ground field from
p = 2 to p = 3. This time we may choose three polynomials of degree 1, three
of degree 2 and two of degree 3, all monic and irreducible, allowing us to reduce
the overall degree of h(x) to deg(h(x)) = 16. In this case, for the same message
size, we get an information rate of
I =
8
16 log2 3
∼= 31, 55% (34)
which is not better than the information rate in [11], for a space of messages of
the same size, yet comparable.
3.2 Flexibility of the protocol
We have already pointed out in the previous sections that the important con-
dition (4) can be fulfilled in several different ways according to the strategy we
use in choosing the carrier polynomials pi’s. In what follows we will present
a strategy that optimises the information rate and one that, to our analysys,
improves security.
We will give a detailed analysis of the asymptotics of the information rate of
our protocol and of NSK, showing that they have the same behaviour. In what
follows our finite field k will be Fq for some prime power q.
3.2.1 Optimization of the information rate
The optimization of the information rate is ensured by the following:
Proposition 4. There exists a strategy that maximises the information rate I
for any choice of q and L. Moreover, in this strategy the information rate is
determined by the closed formula
I(q,N) =
N∑
n=1
1
n
∑
k|n
µ
(
n
k
)
qk(
N∑
n=1
∑
k|n
µ
(
n
k
)
qk + 1
)
log2 q
(35)
where µ(x) is the Möbius function.
Proof. We defined the information rate to be I = L/(deg h log2 q) and we know
that the degree of h depends on the particular choice of carrier polynomials. The
strategy we will consider is simply given by choosing all irreducible polynomials
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of all degrees up to a given degree N . Denote the number of degree-n irreducible
polynomials in Fq[x] by D
q
n, we have the formula
Dqn =
1
n
∑
k|n
µ
(n
k
)
qk
where µ(x) is the Möbius function. The overall number of chosen polynomials,
that is the number of bits that the plain text is composed by, as well as the sum
of the degrees of the pi’s are given by a closed formula, namely:
L =
N∑
n=1
Dqn =
N∑
n=1
∑
k|n
µ
(n
k
) qk
n
(36)
deg(h(x)) =
N∑
n=1
nDqn + 1 =
N∑
n=1
∑
k|n
µ
(n
k
)
qk + 1 (37)
for some maximal degree N (which is dependent on L if we consider L to be the
fundamental parameter). Then, the information rate I as a function of the prime
power q and (implicitly) the parameter L has the desired closed expression.
It is easy to gather that such a choice of the polynomials guarantees maximal
information rate, in that we are lowering as much as possible the degree of h(x)
and as a result the number of bits of the encrypted message.
Remark 10. The obvious disadvantage of the strategy above is that one can
always assume that the bare carrier polynomials are known, for we take all of
them progressively up to degree N. As a matter of fact, the strategy above gives
us a clear upper bound for the information rate, for all different combinations
of L and q. Notice, however, by comparison with the tables of [11], that this is
the same strategy adopted by Naccache and Stern, where the chosen prime p
has the same size of NextPrime(
∏
pi).
Within this strategy it is important to notice that all the variations proposed
in [11, Section 2.3] are importable in the present context. For example, it is
possible to express the message m in a basis different from 2, and this would
lead to some modification to the suitable degrees for our carriers. Moreover, it
is possible to restrict the space of messages to constant-weight strings. This last
choice increases the information rate since it allows to lower the degree of h(x).
In fact, if w is the constant weight, the bound on the degree of h is:
deg h > wN
where N is the highest degree of the chosen carriers.
Apart from these extensions, the standard NSK protocol is summarized in
the table presented in [11, Section 2.2], where the information rate for 512, 1024
and 2048 bits-sized p’s is given. The strategy we have just outlined to reach the
maximal information rate, allows us to obtain the exact values presented in [11]
matching the degree of our polynomial h with the size of their prime p and L
with the sizeM of the message. So we are able to obtain the same information
rate.
The matching procedure works as follows: compute the degree of h obtained
by choosing all polynomials up to a given degree, say 9 to obtain deg h = 977.
11
L (bits) deg h (bits) I
131 1024 12,8 %
233 2048 11,4%
418 4096 11,2%
Table 1: Information rate matching with [11, Section 2.2]
L (bits) M (bits) Size of p & deg h (bits) I
759 758 8192 11,4%
Table 2: Extension to next block and matching of the information rate
Then, top it to the next block, in this case 1024 bits, choosing some polynomials
of one degree higher, in this case 11. This leads to an increase in the number L
of carrier polynomials from 127 to 131, and the information rate is then given
by the ratio L/ degh.
In Table 1 we show how to match the examples presented in [11], and the
last row is obtained by extending their calculations to 4096 bits. If we go further
and compute the relevant figures in the case of 8192 bits we find almost perfect
agreement also in this case (cf. Table 2). It will be clear in what follows why
this happens.
3.2.2 Asymptotics comparison with previous works
We will prove in this section that our protocol has the same asymptotic infor-
mation rate of [11]. A naive explanation of this fact is given by arguing that
the number of primes below a certain number of bits has the same behaviour as
the number of irreducible polynomials in Fq[x] below a certain degree.
Let us fix the notation
aN ∼ bN ⇐⇒ lim
N→∞
aN
bN
= 1.
We will make use of the following
Lemma 5.
N∑
n=1
Dqn ∼
q
q − 1
DqN (38)
Proof. First recall that [17, Theorem 2.2]
Dqn ∼
qn
n
and therefore the sums behave asymptotically as
N∑
n=1
Dqn ∼
N∑
n=1
qn
n
.
Then we have (38) if and only if
lim
N→∞
N∑
n=1
qn
n
qN
N
=
q
q − 1
. (39)
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Now, denote by SN :=
N∑
n=1
N
n
qn−N and observe that it might be expressed in
terms of the recursive sequence
SN+1 =
1
q
N + 1
N
SN + 1. (40)
for the initial value S1 = 1. Consider S− = lim infN→∞ SN and S+ = lim supN→∞ SN .
Passing to the lim sup and lim inf in (40) we get the same equation for S±:
S± =
S±
q
+ 1
provided that they are both finite. Assuming that they are, we conclude that
lim
N→∞
SN = S± =
q
q − 1
(41)
This assumption is legitimate since SN ≥ 0 for all N ∈ N, thus S− ≥ 0, and
for S+ we observe that
• When x ∈ R+ we have that q
x
x
is increasing for x ≥ 1log q ≥ 2, since q ≥ 2,
and in particular this is true for x ∈ N∗;
• lim supN→∞
N
qN
N∑
n=1
qn
n
= lim supN→∞
N
qN
N∑
n=2
qn
n
.
It follows that
lim sup
N→∞
N
qN
N∑
n=1
qn
n
= lim sup
N→∞
N
qN
N∑
n=2
qn
n
≤ lim sup
N→∞
N
qN
N+1∫
2
qx
x
dx
where the last inequality comes from the fact that
N∑
n=2
qn
n
are the lower sums of
N+1∫
2
qx
x
dx, since q
x
x
is increasing for x ≥ 2. Moreover
lim
N→∞
N+1∫
2
qx
x
dx
qN
N
= lim
t→∞
t+1∫
2
qx
x
dx
qt
t
= lim
t→∞
qt+1
t+1
qt
t
(log q − 1
t
)
=
q
log q
where the second equality follows from the De L’Hôpital rule. This proves that
0 ≤ lim inf
N→∞
SN ≤ lim sup
N→∞
SN ≤
q
log q
and yields the claim.
We are now ready to prove
Proposition 6.
I(q,N) ∼
1
log2 q
1
N
(42)
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Proof. Observe that nDqn ∼ q
n and therefore, from (35)
I(q,N) ∼
N∑
n=1
qn
n
log2 q
N∑
n=1
qn
Now, it is easy to gather that
N∑
n=1
qn ∼
q
q − 1
qN (43)
then, plugging the results of (43) and of Lemma 5 into (35), we obtain
I(q,N) ∼
1
log2 q
q
q−1
qN
N
q
q−1q
N
=
1
log2 q
1
N
. (44)
We would like to compare this result with the information rate of the NSK
protocol. Notice that in order to make a consistent comparison we must under-
stand the role of our parameter N in the NSK.
Once q is fixed, bounding the degree of the carrier polynomials by N is the
same as bounding the number of bits required to represent any of them by the
quantity M = ⌊N log2(q)⌋.
The analogous bound for the NSK is then given by bounding the number of
bits of the prime carriers byM . This is the same as bounding the prime carriers
themselves by 2M ≃ qN . In the following proposition the comparison is made
explicit.
Proposition 7. Let N be the bound on the degree of the carrier polynomials
and M = ⌊N log2(q)⌋ the analogous bound for the bits of the prime carriers in
the NSK. The information rate for the NSK protocol is asymptotically given by
INSK ∼
1
log2 q
1
N
. (45)
Proof. It is known [18, Equation 2] that for large m ∈ N∏
p<m
p ∼ em.
Let us consider m = 2M ≃ qN , then
∏
p<qN p ∼ exp q
N . Now, the number of
prime numbers up to qN asymptotically goes, by the prime number theorem, as
pi(qN ) ∼
qN
N ln q
.
In our case this will be the number of carrier prime numbers up to qN . On the
other hand exp qN , which is the size of the prime modulus of [11], has
⌊
qN log2 e
⌋
digits, and therefore the information rate is computed as
INSK ∼
qN
N ln q
qN log2 e
=
1
log2 q
1
N
(46)
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By comparing Propositions 6 and 7 it is now clear that the two information
rates have the same behaviour. This explains that the matching procedure we
perform at the end of the previous section will attain the information rate of
NSK also in the asymptotic limit. Moreover it justifies the claim on the large-N
behaviour of irreducible polynomials with respect to prime numbers.
3.2.3 Some precautions to avoid subgroup-like attacks
The security of this protocol is strictly related to the size of the degree of h and,
as a consequence, to the range of degrees that the carriers can have. Indeed,
when the carriers are chosen within a large set, the attacker will not have chances
(in terms of a brute force attack) to find the pi’s to set up a discrete logarithm
problem for the pair (pi, p
s
i ) for any i.
As a matter of fact, the knowledge of h will only lead to the following infor-
mation on the degrees:
deg(h) =
∑
i
deg(pi) + 1.
This is not the case when working with integers and primes in Z/pZ, where we
can always assume that the prime factors are known when p ≃
∏
i pi.
We first sketch a subgroup like attack in the most unsafe case. Let G be an
abelian group and pv1, . . . , p
v
L be carriers, as in Section 3. Let the order of p
v
i in
G be ni and suppose gcd (ni, nj) = 1 for i 6= j. Let now
Mj = n1 · · ·nj−1 · nj+1 · · ·nL.
It is easy to observe that, for a generic cyphertext c, mj = 1 if and only if
cMj 6= 1. As it is elementary to observe, this leads to decryption in L steps.
Moreover, it can also be adapted to work when the condition gcd (ni, nj) = 1 is
just partially fulfilled. In this case, indeed, only partial information on the text
can be extracted.
Consider now the decomposition in cyclic subgroups of the multiplicative
group of the finite field (Fqd)
∗. In order to avoid subgroup-like attacks on the
cyphertext we will require all the pi’s to be generators of the same subgroup of
large order. This will lead to certain requirements on qd − 1.
The most natural choice to solve this problem is asking that the degree d of
the reducing polynomial h(x) be constrained by the following:
r :=
qd − 1
q − 1
is prime . (47)
Now we have to choose the pi’s such that
pi(x)
r 6= 1 mod h(x) ∀i ∈ {1, . . . , L}. (48)
When these conditions are satisfied, all the pi’s are generators for (Fqd)
∗.
3.3 “Chinese remainder” version
In what follows we will present another example of a protocol that fits the general
picture, which stems on the well known chinese remainder theorem. To do this,
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let us introduce a large prime power q and a natural number L ∈ N. Consider
now the monoid S = (FL+1q )
∗, with the multiplication defined componentwise,
and the set R = {r1, . . . , rL+1} ⊆ Fq.
Let αi ∈ Fq\R ∀i ∈ {1, . . . , L} and choose two large integers u, v such that
uv = 1 mod (q − 1). Compute the following list of vectors pi ∈ (F
L+1
q )
∗ as
(gi)j := (rj − αi)
(pi)j := (gi)
v.
Let
((FL+1q )
∗, {p1, . . . , pL})
be the public key and
({g1, . . . , gL}, {r1 . . . rL})
be the secret key. Let
F : ZL2 −→ S
(m1, . . . ,mL) 7→
L∏
i=1
pmii
be the encryption map.
Remark 11. Observe that the information rate is
L
(L+ 1) log2(q)
.
Proposition 8. F is an injection.
Proof. We define a polynomial on Fq[x] by
hR(x) :=
L+1∏
i=1
(x− ri)
whose set of zeros coincide with R. We will prove the proposition by showing
how to compute the inverse over the image of F using h(x), i.e. we will show
how to uniquely decrypt any cyphertext c ∈ ℑ(F ) using the secret key. Let
ψ : S −→ S
x 7→ xv
G : Fq[x]/hR(x)
CRT
−→ FLq
k(x) 7→ (k(r1), . . . , k(rL))
and
Γ : Fq[x]/hR(x) −→ Fq[x]
be the canonical lift. The decryption mapD is given by checking Γ(G−1(ψ−1(x)))
modulo gi(x) = (x− αi): whenever it is zero it means mi = 1, where ψ
−1(x) =
xu. Observe that the decryption is well defined: the map
αψ∼ : Z
L
2 −→ Fq[x]/(hR(x))
is clearly injective (and then α∼ is, by Proposition 1) since the product of all
the gi(x) has degree L < L+1. Observe that ∼ is as usual the relation induced
by the ideal of hR(x).
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4 Outlook and further research
In the present communication we have given a new setting to produce many ex-
amples of knapsack encryption schemes, showing also how a remarkable example
such as [11] perfectly fits our framework. We have proposed a next-to-simplest
example when the monoid is chosen to be (k[x], ·), one realization of which is
given by Fq[x] reduced by the ideal of an irreducible polynomial of suitable
degree.
This brand new application of the knapsack idea reproduces the key results
presented in [11] in terms of information rate, but allows us to improve some
important features such as
• the information rate is shown to be deterministic by providing an exact
formula for it (cf. [11, Section 2.2]).
• it reduces the computations over Fqd with p ∼ q
d but q ≪ p, where Fq is
a field of small characteristic.
A non trivial variation of this scheme has been found, by taking into account
a polynomial which splits over the base field and applying the chinese remainder
theorem, allowing the computations to be performed over a direct sum of fields.
In [11] Naccache and Stern conjectured that it might be possible to elliptic
curve their scheme, and the new general framework we have presented might be
of some help to address this problem.
Moreover, it would be interesting to see how the recent improvements to the
NSK protocol presented in [16] may apply to our polynomial instance. This will
be matter of further studies.
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